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Observations on the Manual for Complex and 
Multidistrict Litigation 
In recent years there has been increased pressure on the federal 
judicial system for improved efficiency in dealing with "the big 
case." Such cases typically involve either large numbers of plaintiffs, 
suing in many district courts on essentially the same facts, or many 
complex and interrelated issues which require the evaluation of 
large quantities of data. Because those cases require considerable 
amounts of judicial time which cannot lightly be spared from deal-
ing with the mounting backlog of cases faced by virtually all courts, 
and because a great deal of potentially protracted litigation is certain 
to arise in the future, it is imperative that means be devised to deal 
expeditiously with big cases. Responding to that demand, the Co-
Ordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation of the United States 
District Courts1 promulgated the Manual for Complex and Multi-
district Litigation (Manual) 2 in an attempt to outline methods for 
dealing efficiently with such cases. The purpose of this Comment is 
to discuss the Manual's significant proposals and to focus attention on 
recommendations which may prove troublesome in application.3 
The first officially organized attempt to deal with the big case was 
prompted by a series of protracted antitrust cases ansmg 
during and after World War II.4 A committee, chaired by Judge 
1. The Co-Ordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation was a special subcom-
mittee of the Committee on Pretrial Procedures and Practices of the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States. The original members of the subcommittee were appointed 
by Chief Justice Earl Warren in January 1962. 
The actual administration of complex cases has been delegated to the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. 29 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
2. The Manual has been published in 1 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE pt. 2 (2d ed. 
1969) [hereinafter MANUAL]. 
A board of editors, headed by Senior District Judge Thomas J. Clary of the 
Third Circuit, has been appointed to supervise publication and revision of the Manual. 
Comments and recommendations regarding the Manual should be directed to: 
The Board of Editors 
Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation 
The Federal Judicial Center 
Dolley Madison House, 1520 H Street 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
3. This Comment is not meant to be a thorough analysis of all the many problems 
that will no doubt be encountered as the Manual becomes widely accepted and used. 
Rather, the Comment's purpose is to serve as a general introductory critique of the 
Manual and to focus attention on various difficulties which must be recognized and 
dealt with by the judges and lawyers in order to implecent the Manual as a workable 
guide for handling potentially protracted litigation. 
4. E.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), 
91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18 
(N.D. Cal. 1949); United States v. New York Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 
626 (D.C. Ill. 1946); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 
1945); United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 46 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ohio 1942); 
United States v. Food &: Grocery Bureau, 43 F. Supp. 974 (S.D. Cal. 1941); see McAllister, 
[ 303] 
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E. Barrett Prettyman and composed of circuit and district judges, 
was appointed in 1949 by Chief Justice Vinson to study protracted 
litigation. The committee in its report, entitled Procedure in Anti-
Trust and Other Protracted Cases,5 defined its duty as the elimina-
tion of the "unnecessary delay, volume and expense," caused 
primarily by "(I) vagueness of the issues, (2) proffers of masses of 
unnecessary evidence, and (3) lack of organization of material and 
personnel."6 The committee's report stressed that the responsibility 
for streamlining these cases lay chiefly with the trial judge.7 The 
principal recommendations called for the extensive use of pretrial 
conferences and for detailed rules for the handling of bulk docu-
mentary evidence. The pretrial conferences were to be directed at 
particularizing the issues and disposing of preliminary motions.8 The 
recommendations concerning documents called for full disclosure of 
such documents to all parties prior to the use of the documents at 
trial, and they set forth a procedure for proper identification tech-
niques in order to save time at trial.9 The recommendations were 
worded strongly, but the committee made it clear that their recom-
mendations were "not ... legislation or rules" but only "a descrip-
tion of remedial methods and measures thought by experienced 
judges to be effective."10 
Several years later, Chief Justice Warren appointed a committee 
composed of members of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States to ensure that the Prettyman Report was properly "vitalized." 
The committee held seminars in the summers of 1957,11 1958,12 and 
195913 and ultimately produced the Handbook of Recommended 
Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases (Handbook).14 The 
Handbook consisted of a series of recommendations, based on the 
Prettyman Report, followed by extensive comments. As its foreword 
The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARV. L. REv. 27, 33-61 
(1950). 
5. Reprinted in 13 F.R.D. 62 (1953) (dated Sept. 26, 1951). 
6. Id. at 65-66. 
7. Id. at 65. 
8. Id. at 66-73. 
9. Id. at 74-75. In this connection, the committee's report suggested a shifting of 
the burden of proving relevancy, materiality, and competency to the party introducing 
the documents. Id. at 76. 
IO. Id. at 64. 
II. See Proc. of the Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States Circuit and 
District Judges, 21 F.R.D. 395 (1958) (held Aug. 26-30, 1957, at New York Univ. Law 
Center). 
12. See Proc. of the Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States Judges, 23 
F.R.D. 319 (1959) (held Aug. 25-30, 1958, at Stanford Univ. School of Law). 
13. See Proc. of a Seminar Held at the Univ. of Colorado School of Law, July 
13-15, 1959 (unpublished report). 
14. Reprinted in 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960) (adopted March 1960). 
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made clear, it similarly was not a set of rules to be strictly followed, 
but merely a basic outline of procedures culled from judicial ex-
perience to be used as judges saw fit in individual cases.15 
The most immediate stimulus for the :Manual, however, was the 
massive private antitrust litigation arising from conspiracies in the 
electrical equipment industry in the early 1960's. Over 1,900 civil 
actions were filed in thirty-five district courts between 1961 and 
1963.16 It was feared not only that this wave of cases might flood the 
federal courts, but also that absent unusual measures, duplication of 
efforts in discovery and conflicting decisions on the same evidence 
would be unavoidable. 
In 1961, the Judicial Conference of the United States set up a 
special panel to deal with the problem. It was named the Co-Ordi-
nating Committee for Multiple Litigation of the United States 
District Courts. The Committee suggested that a means of com-
munication be established among all the judges involved in the 
cases, that those judges follow the pretrial control techniques pre-
scribed in the existing Handbook, and that procedures be devised 
for avoiding repetitious discovery. Among the devices eventually 
used were nationwide pretrial hearings and orders, nationwide de-
positions, a central information center, and a central document 
center. 
Having found many of these somewhat novel procedures to be 
effective tools in handling the electrical equipment cases, the Com-
mittee undertook to produce the Manual for Complex and Multi-
district Litigation as a guide for judges who would have to deal with 
similar cases in the future. The Manual incorporates many of the 
techniques which were employed for the first time in the electrical 
equipment cases, along with several procedures based upon the 
Handbook. 
The Manual is divided into two main parts. Part I contains pre-
trial and trial procedures recommended for complex or multidistrict 
cases; it is divided into four main sections: Introduction; Pretrial 
Procedures in Complex Civil Cases; Pretrial Procedures in Multiple 
and M ultidistrict Civil Litigation; and Pretrial Procedures in Com-
plex Criminal Cases. Part II of the Manual is an Appendix of Ma-
terials which might be useful in following the recommended proce-
dures. The materials include suggested local court rules, sample 
court orders, and extended discussions and citations of authority 
on some of the points raised in Part I. 
15. Id. at 355. 
16. See Neal &: Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel Judicial 
Administration, 50 A.B.A.J. 621 (1964); Address by Chief Justice Warren, 44th Annual 
Meeting of the ALI, May 16, 1967, in 44 ALI PROC. 6-7 (1967). 
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I. IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES 
The first step in dealing with protracted litigation is to identify 
the cases to which application of special procedures may ultimately 
prove useful.17 The Manual recommends three means of making that 
identification. All three essentially involve an attempt to canvass 
everyone who might be able to identify a potentially protracted case. 
The first identification device is an inspection of complaints by 
the clerk of the district court.18 To facilitate his identification of 
potentially big cases, the Manual lists eleven categories into which 
protracted litigation normally falls.19 If the case falls within any of 
those eleven categories, the clerk is to notify the judge assigned to 
that case, the chief district judge, and the Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts.20 If the case involves potential multidistrict 
litigation, the chief circuit judge is to be notified as well. But the 
overinclusiveness of the list, which covers practically all federal-
question civil litigation, minimizes its utility.21 Clearly, the often 
complicated procedures of the Manual should not be applied auto-
matically to every case that comes within one of the categories 
listed.22 Thus, the procedure results only in shifting the identifica-
17. MANUAL § 0.2, at 9. 
18. Id. § 0.23[1], at 10. 
19. Id. § 0.22, at 9. The eleven categories are (I) antitrust cases; (2) cases involving a 
large number of parties or an unincorporated association of large membership; (3) 
cases involving requests for injunctive relief affecting the operations of a large entity; 
(4) patent, copyright, and trademark cases; (5) common disaster cases; (6) individual 
stockholders', stockholders' derivative, and stockholders' representative actions; (7) 
products liability cases; (8) cases arising as a result of prior or pending Government 
litigation; (9) multiple or multidistrict litigation; (IO) class actions or potential cJass 
actions; and (11) other cases involving unusual multiplicity or complexity of factual 
issues. 
20. Id. § 0.23[1], at IO. 
21. The categories have been specifically criticized on at least two counts. Both 
actions involving a large number of parties and actions by shareholders are often class 
actions handled under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 and 23.1 and are inappro-
priate for many of the procedures in the Manual. Moreover, both trademark and 
products liability actions frequently are small and should be handled under the usual 
civil procedures. See Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York City, Memorandum for the 
ABA Special Comm. on Complex and Multidistrict Litigation, July IO, 1968, at 10-11 
[hereinafter Cravath Memorandum] (Copies of the memoranda, letters, reports, and 
drafts of the Manual cited in this Comment are on file in the offices of Chief Judge 
"\V'illiam H. Becker, United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, 
United States Court House, Kansas City, Missouri 64106.) 
22. "If the recommended procedures outlined in the Manual were followed in all 
cases falling into the categories specified, both court and counsel would be unnecessarily 
burdened, and interminable delays would result from unproductive adherence to the 
outlined procedures." American College of Trial Lawyers, Report of Special Comm., 
May 27, 1968, at 8 [hereinafter A.C.T.L. Report]. "Automatically to invoke the 
cumbersome procedure set forth in the [Manual] in relatively simple patent cases 
would be like using a sledge hammer to drive a thumb tack." Letter from Stuart A. 
White of Ward, McElhannon, Brooks & Fitzpatrick, New York City, to Walther E. 
Wyss of Mason, Kolehemainen, Rathbum & Wyss, Chicago, June 11, 1968, at 1. 
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tion burden from the clerk to the judge, for the latter must still cull 
the actual complex cases from the large universe of cases within the 
eleven categories. Accordingly, after notification, the judge must de-
velop criteria for deciding which of the many cases in these categories 
may prove to be complex. 
The second method suggested to aid in identifying cases subject 
to Manual procedures has limited usefulness, since it pertains only 
to cases either based on or arising from governmental action. In 
such cases, the assigned judge or the chief district judge is to contact 
the appropriate governmental agencies for aid in determining 
whether the case may be complex or multidistrict.23 An earlier draft 
of the Manual suggested that the judge contact these governmental 
agencies without consulting counsel,24 but that suggestion aroused 
criticism because of the possibility that the Government's spokesman 
might make statements adverse to the interests of one or more of the 
litigants.25 If, for example, a representative from the Justice Depart-
ment, while in the process of informing the judge that he should 
anticipate private damage suits to be filed in several circuits, should 
describe to that judge evidence which his office had found of price-
fixing conspiracies in several parts of the country, the judge might be 
prejudiced about the case he was about to hear. For this reason, the 
Manual indicates that counsel should be consulted before outside 
contacts are made.26 If, after consultation, the judge decides to con-
tact a governmental agency, he may satisfy the objections of counsel 
by permitting their presence at the meeting. 
The third suggested means of identifying complex or multidis-
trict litigation is to require each attorney who files a complaint or 
an answer in a civil case to notify the clerk of the district court in 
·writing of the nature and details of the case, indicating whether any 
action which is or may be related to the case has been filed in any 
federal or state court.27 If related actions have been filed, the at-
torney must provide the titles, docket numbers, and courts of all 
such cases. In some circumstances, the burden imposed by this re-
quirement would be overwhelming. For example, a litigant wishing 
to recover for the ·wrongful death of a passenger in the crash of a 
commercial airliner would have to search the records of every court 
in the country in order to discover all the suits that had been filed 
to recover for the deaths of the other passengers. Moreover, it seems 
23. MANUAL § 0.23[2], at 10. 
24. Proposed Draft of the Manual, May 2, 1968, at 12. 
25. E.g., Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21, at 12. See also ABA Section of 
General Practice, Ad Hoc Comm. Comments on "The Manual," July 1, 1968, at 1 
[hereinafter ABA Section of General Practice Memorandum]. 
26. MANUAL § 0.23[2], at 10. 
27. Id. § 0.23[3], at 10. 
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superfluous to require written notice to the clerk in every civil ac-
tion filed. On the other hand, if in fact the attorney is aware of 
pending related actions, it does not seem impractical to require him 
to bring those cases to the attention of the court clerk. However, 
the attorney's obligation of notice should include only those related 
cases about which he or his client has actual knowledge.28 
Each of the Manual's suggestions has certain drawbacks. Only 
two of the proposed methods are directed toward the goal of iden-
tifying complex cases-inspection of pleadings by the clerk and con-
tact with governmental agencies. The third suggestion, attorney 
identification of related cases, is designed solely to discover multi-
district litigation. Moreover, even the first two methods are limited 
in their potential for identification. If the clerk's only screening 
function is to determine whether newly filed cases fall into one of 
the eleven categories of complex cases, it is unlikely that the poten-
tially big cases will be discovered, since those categories are over-
inclusive.29 In addition; contact with the Government will help a 
judge only insofar as the governmental agency has information about 
the problem that spawned the litigation. 
There are, however, more direct and possibly more accurate 
methods that a judge might employ to decide whether a new case 
warrants special treatment. For example, when the clerk has noted 
that a case falls into one of the eleven categories, and when the 
judge's own perusal of the papers filed indicates that the case may be 
complex, the judge could contact the attorneys in the case in order 
to ascertain their current views of possible issues involved and their 
opinions as to the applicability of some or all of the Manual's proce-
dures. Instead of holding a formal hearing,30 such contact could be 
made effectively by telephone with less attendant cost and delay. To 
overcome fears that the judge might be prejudiced through tele-
phone contact with one party alone, and to minimize the judicial 
time taken by that procedure, a "conference call" with attorneys 
from both sides would be the best method of obtaining the informa-
tion. 
Another desirable method for identifying complex and multi-
district cases, and one that the Manual has ignored, is the use of 
computers for data processing. Indeed, the portion of the Manual 
28. Letter from Julian 0. von Kalinowski of Gibson, Dunn &: Crutcher, Los 
Angeles, to Whitney N. Seymour of Simpson, Thatcher &: Bartlett, New York City, 
July 12, 1968, at 4 [hereinafter Gibson Memorandum]; Kirkland, Ellis, Hodson, 
Chaffetz &: Masters, Chicago, Memorandum for the ABA Special Comm. on Complex and 
Multi-District Litigation, June 26, 1968, at 4-5 [hereinafter Kirkland Memorandum]. 
29. See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text. 
30. The Manual provides that at the first principal pretrial conference, the court 
should ascertain the current views of counsel concerning the issues in the case. MANUAL 
§ 1.2, at 20. See text accompanying notes 34-35 infra. 
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dealing with identification procedures is indicative of the document's 
general failure to incorporate new ideas and techniques. Although 
a guidebook that is meant to be of present utility to the bench ob-
viously cannot rely too heavily on currently impractical techniques, 
the Manual has restricted itself unnecessarily to the traditional 
framework of judicial administration and has ignored modern tech-
nolgy. A number of courts are now using automatic data processing 
techniques to reduce their backlogs through improved scheduling, 
more sophisticated statistic-gathering, and similar procedures.31 The 
basic tool of those computer-assisted administrative systems is a 
punch card-made when the case is filed-which contains, in coded 
form, the names of the litigants and their attorneys and the issues 
involved in the action. The information derived from such cards 
could be electronically transferred to a Judicial Data Center, where 
it could be processed for cross references to cases involving related 
issues, parties, and transactions or occurrences.32 That procedure 
would accomplish the task of identifying multidistrict litigation-a 
task which the Manual now unrealistically assigns to each attorney. 
Likewise, through statistical analysis and simulation, it would be pos-
sible to determine what factors tend to make a case complex.33 That 
determination, in turn, would generate a realistic indicator of com-
plexity to replace the clearly overinclusive categories set forth in the 
Manual. While the use of computers for identification involves only 
a few of the many possible applications of technological advances 
to judicial administration, that use could be so beneficial that the 
Manual, and those actually dealing with complex and multidistrict 
cases, should not ignore it altogether. 
II. PRETRIAL PROCEDURE 
The Afanual recommends that the handling of complex cases 
prior to trial be done in four stages. Each stage begins with a con-
ference which is designed to focus attention on the real issues in the 
case and to refine those issues for a more speedy and effective trial. 
The preliminary pretrial conference is to be held as soon as it is 
apparent that the case may involve protracted litigation.34 At that 
conference the judge should assume active control of the case and 
ascertain the current views of all counsel on the issues. Also at this 
!II. See Davidson 8: Davidson, Computerized Court Calendaring, 54 A.B.A.J. 1097 
(1968). 
!12. For a discussion of the use of Data Centers, see Halloran, Judicial Data Centers, 
4 TRIAL 14 (Dec.-Jan. 1967-1968). 
!!!I. See Navarro &: Taylor, An Application of Systems Analysis To Aid in the Effi-
cient Administration of Justice, 51 JUDICATURE 47 (1967); Higginbotham &: Freed, The 
Trial Backlog and Computer Analysis, 44 F.R.D. 104 (1967). 
!14. MANUAL § 1.0, at 17. 
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point a timetable is to be established for the filing of pleadings and 
nondiscovery motions. Moreover, according to the Aianual, the 
judge should fulfill several other functions at the first conference; 
those functions include investigating the possibilities for consolida-
tion of related cases, inquiring about joinder of additional parties 
or the pursuance of a class action, scheduling the submission of 
preliminary legal questions, considering the appointment of liaison 
counsel, and urging counsel to cooperate in eliminating unnecessary 
objections and motions. Finally, at this time, the judge should 
schedule the "first wave" of discovery--discovery unrelated to the 
merits of the case.35 
The second pretrial conference is to be held after most of the 
preliminary discovery has been completed and before discovery on 
the merits begins.36 At this conference the court is to dispose of any 
threshold questions of law, such as the permissibility of a class action 
or the effect of a statute of limitations. In addition, the court should 
set a time for completion of the first wave of discovery and establish 
a schedule for the second wave--discovery on the merits. Finally, 
the judge should explore the need for creation of document depos-
itories, set dates prior to which discovery will not be permitted, 
inquire about the possible use of expert or computer evidence, and 
discuss estimated trial dates. 
The third conference37 serves primarily as an opportunity for 
the judge to compile final schedules for the completion of discovery, 
to set dates both for the final pretrial conference and for the trial, 
and to appoint a neutral expert, if one is desired. In addition, it is 
the time at which counsel must file pretrial briefs, witness and ex-
hibit lists, voir dire questions, and proposed jury instructions. 
The fourth and final conference is designed to streamline the 
actual trial of the case.38 At that conference, the judge should rule 
on objections to offers of proof, to depositions, or to documentary 
evidence, and should issue preclusion orders for matters not con-
tained in the pretrial briefs. It is also the time for the court to ap-
point spokesmen or liaison counsel for trial and to set limitations 
on opening statements, on the number of witnesses, and on scope of 
testimony. Finally, at the fourth conference, the use of alternate 
jurors or of fewer than twelve jurors and the possibility of settlement 
should be discussed. 
The timetable established by the Manual £or the pretrial han-
35. The first wave of discovery should cover the identity and location both of 
witnesses and of physical- (documentary) evidence, information needed for motions on 
legal defenses such as that of privilege or that of the statute of limitations, and any 
discovery designed to define or narrow the ultimate issues. Id. § 1.0, at 17-18; § 1.8, at 
21; § 1.5, at 22; § 1.7, at 24; § 1.8, at 25. 
36. Id. § 2.0, at 28. 
37. Id. § 3.0, at 58. 
88. Id. § 4.0, at 75. 
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clling by the court of a complex case has been criticized for its ap-
parent rigidity.39 Although the Manual professes to encourage 
judicial flexibility and inventiveness in dealing with complex cases, 
it frequently cautions against deviations from its suggestions con-
cerning procedure and timing, on the ground that those suggestions 
constitute the most effective methods that have been devised.40 The 
procedures recommended in the Manual, however, are based heavily 
upon judicial experience with the electrical equipment cases,41 and 
some of the procedural problems in those cases were sui generis, if 
only in terms of the number of cases involved. Methods effective in 
dealing with the problems in those cases are not directly applicable 
to all the varied situations in which complex cases arise. Nonetheless, 
it cannot be denied that judicially structured pretrial procedures are 
required in big cases to avoid inefficient use of the judicial process. 
When a case involves nearly a hundred parties, or when discovery 
involves thousands of documents and weeks of depositions, the judge 
cannot allow the attorneys to proceed with pretrial at their own 
leisurely pace. Some freedom of counsel in the management of the 
case, therefore, must necessarily be sacrificed. 
The Manual has also been attacked for its emphasis on the estab-
lishment by the trial court of strict timetables-ones to which all 
parties are expected to adhere-for pleadings, motions, and stages 
of discovery.42 In the area of discovery, for example, the Manual 
suggests that different waves of discovery be used, with specific 
objectives to be reached in each wave before proceeding to the 
next.43 Since, in that procedure, all parties are to move simulta-
neously through the various stages, the court will be forced to delay 
the parties who already possess the preliminary information of the 
first wave44 from proceeding to discovery on the merits, until such 
time as all parties have completed their preliminary discovery.45 
Although an exception may be granted when an emergency situation 
exists-such as when discovery on the merits of a narrow issue may 
be decisive of the case46-such variations are discouraged.47 Some 
39. See A.C.T.L. Report, supra note 22, at 12-13; Cravath Memorandum, supra note 
21, at 7, 15-16, 19-21. 
40. MANUAL 6. 
41. Id. at viii-ix. See Memorandum on Suggestions and Comments Received on 
Outline 1 (prepared by the staff of the subcommittee in charge of drafting the Manual) 
(hereinafter Outline Memorandum]. 
42. E.g., MANUAL § 1.3, at 21; § 1.5, at 22; § 2.3, at 30; § 2.7, at 57; § 3.3, at 64-68; 
id. § 4.7, at 83 (days and hours of trial); id. § 3.4, at 69 (date for final pretrial confer-
ence); id. § 3.1, at 59. (time schedules). 
43. Id. § 1.5, at 22; § 2.3, at 30. 
44. Id. § 2.3, at 30. See note 35 supra. 
45. Id. § 0.5, at 16; § 2,3, at 30. 
46. Id. § 1.7, at 24. 
47. Id. § 2.4, at 31. 
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commentators have argued that because this procedure is so strict, 
and because it requires so much involvement by the court, it is in-
consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are 
designed to permit great latitude and flexibility in the discovery 
process by allowing discovery to be handled primarily by counsel 
with a minimum of resort to the court.48 Nonetheless, while this is 
true in the abstract, arguably the procedures of the Manual have 
not run afoul of the discovery policy of the Federal Rules. Rather, 
the Manual has attempted to achieve a reasonable accommodation 
between permissible freedom and the unrestrained chaos which 
could arise from lack of organization in a protracted case. 
There is little doubt that schedules for discovery and for other 
proceedings will serve a useful function as guidelines or target dates 
for the accomplishment of the various stages of the litigation. There-
fore, to the extent that the time limits are reasonable, adherence to 
such schedules should be maintained. Nevertheless, the time limits 
could have an unforeseen prejudicial effect in some situations, such 
as when a litigant, despite a diligent effort, has been unable to locate 
a certain person prior to the deadline for taking depositions on the 
merits. Thus, the level of prejudice which a litigant must show to 
obtain an adjustment of deadlines should not be high.49 
III. LIAISON COUNSEL 
The Manual's recommendation that liaison counsel be appointed 
when there are multiple parties on one or both sides of a complex 
case50 has caused repeated comment from members of the bar.'11 The 
Manual suggests that the court's difficulty in communicating with 
multiple counsel may make it desirable for the court to request the 
parties to select at pretrial one or more from their number to serve 
as liaison counsel. Although the Manual contemplates that the 
parties themselves stipulate the functions of such counsel, it makes 
several recommendations as to what functions should be stipulated. 
According to the Manual, the liaison counsel should receive notice 
on behalf of all counsel when such meetings are needed for coordi-
48. Although this policy is not specified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it 
is implicit in rules 26-37. See Letter from David J. Armstrong of Dickie, McCamey 8: 
Chicote, Pittsburgh, to Cyrus V. Anderson, Associate General Counsel, PPG Industries, 
Inc., Pittsburgh, May 24, 1968, at 3 [hereinafter Dickie Memorandum]. 
49. "Experience in the electrical cases indicates that once a lengthy schedule is 
published, 'tentative' or not, it becomes diflicult to alter even for what normally would 
be 'good cause shown.' Judges are reluctant to extend an early date because that 
change snowballs." Kirkland Memorandum, supra note 28, at 5-6. 
50. MANUAL § 1.9, at 26. 
51. See, e.g., Co-Ordinating Comm. on Complex and Multidistrict Litigation, Special 
Meeting on Recommended Changes in the Proposed Manual for Complex and Multiple 
Litigation, San Francisco, July 24, 1968, at 45 (remarks of Don H. Jackson of Jackson, 
Barker &: Sherman, Kansas City, Mo.) [hereinafter Special Meeting]. 
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nating discovery, for agreeing upon responses to questions and sug-
gestions of the court, or for initiating proposals, suggestions, 
proposed orders, and proposed schedules during pretrial proceedings. 
During the trial, the liaison counsel should be authorized to act on 
minor procedural matters without specific prior consultation.52 Ob-
jections made by him may be relied on by any other party without 
repetition. 
The Manual states that in the event that the parties are not able 
to agree upon who should act as liaison counsel, the court has the 
power to make the appointment."53 The source of that power is 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), which permits the court to 
"make such orders . . . as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or 
delay." The few courts that have appointed liaison counsel, however, 
have viewed the action as an extraordinary measure which should 
be taken only under compelling circumstances and not when more 
conventional remedies are available.54 In addition, the court-ap-
pointed general counsel in those cases was not intended to be either 
a substitute for the counsel of each party or a court-appointed master 
of litigation. Rather, his function was to supervise and coordinate 
the activities of the other attorneys; each attorney was still free to 
present his own case, to examine witnesses if he wished, and to open 
and close before the jury. Furthermore, the burden was placed upon 
the party seeking the appointment of a liaison counsel to show suf-
ficient justification for such an appointment.55 In any event, the 
appointment of a liaison counsel lies within the discretion of the 
judge. If opportunity does exist for conserving substantial amounts 
of time and expense, appointment should be made unless prejudice 
to a litigant's case would result. 
It seems to be generally accepted that the use of liaison counsel 
may in many instances be an extremely useful device which may re-
sult in the conservation of both time and money for all parties in-
volved. 56 For example, in many cases, briefs on the primary issues 
may be combined to avoid needless repetition of substantially the 
same points. Likewise, questioning of witnesses at trial may often be 
52. MANUAL § 4.8, at 84. A principal examining counsel for each side during trial 
is also recommended. Presumably, however, that does not preclude other counsel from 
making additional objections and responses. 
53. MANUAL § 1.9, at 26 n.27. However, the Manual states that caution should be 
observed in appointing liaison counsel over the objection of one or more parties. 
54. MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1958); see Rando v. Luckenback 
Steamship Co., 25 F.R.D. 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). The MacAlister court suggested that the 
use of a single judge (see note 166 infra and accompanying text) may obviate the need 
for liaison counsel. 
55. MacAiister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1958). 
56. See Outline Memorandum, supra note 41, at 4. That consensus is absent, how• 
ever, when the parties' interests differ. In such instances, no appointment of liaison 
counsel should be made. 
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handled by one or two counsel from the group in order not to an-
tagonize the judge or the jury by subjecting them to tedious, repet-
itive examinations. 157 
One concern that has been expressed over the Manual's recom-
mendation is that a liaison counsel may be appointed to represent 
litigants whose interests are related but not identical.58 The Manual 
has responded to that problem by stating that many conditions, 
including conflicts of interest and of legal theories, may make it 
undesirable to compel the delegation of authority to a single repre-
sentative counsel.59 But when minor conflicts do exist, it may be 
possible for the court to select several liaison counsel--one repre-
sentative of each position. In a large shareholders' derivative suit, 
for instance, it might be best to appoint one liaison counsel to repre-
sent the holders of each class of securities. By doing so, each major 
interest group would have representation, but some measure of the 
efficiency gained by dealing with a relatively small number of coun-
sel would be preserved. 
Another objection to the use of liaison counsel is that, even 
when the parties' interests are virtually identical, counsel will often 
wish to use differing litigation strategies or legal arguments.60 There 
is also a fear that disparities in tactical abilities between the liaison 
counsel and the various other counsel might adversely affect the 
position of those parties whose counsel do not serve as liaison. The 
answer to these objections is that the liaison counsel's primary 
function is to serve as a coordinator between the court and the many 
parties, not to exercise binding authority on behalf of the coparties. 
What representative authority he does possess is limited to proce-
dural matters unless the parties agree that he should have such 
authority for other purposes. In that light, then, it does not seem 
overly harsh to permit liaison counsel to fix the dates for pretrial 
hearings or to commit others to a discovery timetable. It is true, how-
ever, that procedural decisions sometimes will have a direct effect 
on the substance of a case. Accordingly, if a party is able to show 
that possible material prejudice to his case has arisen from the ac-
tions of a liaison couns~l, he should be granted relief. For example, 
if liaison counsel's deposition of a witness has been incomplete, 
another counsel, upon showing potential material prejudice, should 
be afforded the opportunity to depose the same witness. Of course, 
continual objections and the resultant hearings to show prejudice 
would cause delay and would perhaps negate the intended benefits 
of the use of liaison counsel. Therefore, the authority granted to 
57. See Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21, at 17. 
58. Id. at 18. 
59. MANUAL § 1.9, at 26. 
60. Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21, at 18. 
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the liaison counsel should, at the outset, be carefully delineated and 
limited so as to exclude the power to bind the litigants on matters 
of substance and thus to preclude frequent objection.61 
The necessity of compensating liaison counsel for the time he 
spends discharging representative functions raises another problem. 
Parties may well be reluctant to permit their attorneys to serve as 
representatives when there is little chance that they will recover the 
additional expenses involved.62 In fact, some litigants simply may 
not be able to bear the burden of paying their attorneys for the 
added time required to carry out the duties of liaison counsel.63 
There are various possible solutions to this problem. In Rando v. 
Luckenbach Steamship Company,64 cited by the Manual as authority 
for the court to appoint liaison counsel on its mvn motion, the ap-
pointment was made upon agreement of counsel to serve in a liaison 
capacity without additional compensation. Absent such agreement, 
the costs could be allocated in relation to the benefit derived. Thus, 
if a party has been spared the time and expense of repeated produc-
tion of documents, that should be reflected in a partial payment of 
fees by him to the liaison counsel. In addition, the expenses saved 
by attorneys for the other parties could be used to offset any in-
creased cost of having a representative attorney. However, because 
the potential savings resulting from the use of liaison counsel could 
be greater than the added expenses, and because the allocation de-
scribed above may be difficult and time-consuming, perhaps the best 
solution is to have all parties being represented by a particular liai-
son attorney agree to divide his expenses equally. 
IV. DOCUMENT DEPOSITORIES 
A procedure recommended by the Manual and used quite ex-
tensively during the course of the electrical equipment cases is the 
establishment of document depositories.611 The purpose of such de-
positories is to eliminate the duplication of discovery efforts which 
arises when many parties are seeking discovery of the same material. 
For instance, if several plaintiffs alleging a price fixing conspiracy 
seek to discover the correspondence of marketing executives in each 
defendant company, all of the requested documents normally would 
have to be duplicated several times or the files of each company 
61. A.C.T.L. Report, supra note 22, at 14. 
62. E.g., Letter from Theodore W. Anderson, Jr., of Pendleton, Neuman, Seibold 
&: Williams, Chicago, to Walther E. Wyss of Mason, Kolehmainen, Rathbum &: Wyss, 
Chicago, June 14, 1968, at 8 [hereinafter Pendleton Memorandum]. 
63. See Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21, at 17. 
64. 25 F.R.D. 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). 
65. MANUAL § 2.5, at 32; see Baldridge, Problems Raised in Multiple Litigation, 
11 ANTITRusr Buu.. 635, 638 (1966). 
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opened repeatedly in order to permit inspection. When the number 
of plaintiffs is in the hundreds, as in the electrical equipment cases, 
the duplication can run to over a million documents and the hours 
devoted to inspection of the files may exceed several thousand. If 
each plaintiff must travel to each plant of every company to inspect 
the files, the time and expense involved in discovery can be very 
great. By setting up centralized depositories for such documents, 
the burden and expense of document discovery is minimized. Hours 
for inspection under the supervision of defendant's agents can be ar-
ranged without burdening the normal operations of the party being 
discovered. Moreover, expenses of travelling to the central depository 
will be, in most instances, substantially less than would be incurred 
otherwise. 
The Manual extolls the use of document depositories as "a major 
step fonvard in the orderly, efficient and economical processing of 
the complex case.''66 Some members of the bar, however, argue that 
depositories will often not be profitable and should be employed 
only in unusual circumstances. 67 The basic criticism of depositories 
is directed at the time and expense involved in their maintenance.68 
The Manual appears to meet that criticism by recommending that 
this procedure be used only when depositing documents at one or 
more convenient locations will result in reduced expenses, time, and 
effort. 611 The determination as to the propriety of establishing de-
positories is to be made by the judge after consultation with counsel. 
In that determination, problems concerning available space, hours 
of access, and custodial expense should be considered;70 but they are 
only some of the factors to be weighed in exploring the feasibility 
of using a depository and should not be determinative. Certainly in 
many cases, such as massive multidistrict litigation, the use of de-
positories will prove to be the most efficient means for implementing 
discovery. In a close case, the interest of the party undergoing dis-
covery in the continued smooth operation of his business, free from 
the excessive burden of repetitive discovery, should militate in favor 
of the central depository. 
The Manual suggests that control of the depository may be either 
retained by the parties or taken by the court.71 The suggestion that 
66. MANUAL § 2.5, at 32. 
67. See, e.g., A.C.T.L. Report, supra note 22, at 15; Cravath Memorandum, supra 
note 21, at 21-22. "[T]he overwhelming consensus is that depositories should only be 
used under extraordinary circumstances. Unless so used, document depositories are 
too expensive and time-consuming to maintain." Outline Memorandum, supra note 
41, at 5. 
68. Outline Memorandum, supra note 41, at 5. 
69. MANUAL § 2.5, at 32. 
70. A.C.T L. Report, supra note 22, at 15. 
71. MANUAL § 2.5, at 32. 
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the court can maintain control of the depository has been criticised 
on the ground that it will encourage the court to move outside the 
area of its permissible functions.72 According to that criticism, the 
court's control will force it to be in continual, intimate contact with 
the materials produced for discovery, and will thereby prompt it to 
determine on its own initiative what documents have or have not 
been produced and to compel compliance with discovery orders. 
Performing such functions, it is argued, is the obligation of opposing 
counsel, rather than of the court; and, in any event, is incompatible 
with the goal of efficient judicial administration.73 That argument, 
however, is not convincing. Indeed, it is quite consistent with the 
goal of efficient judicial administration for the court to take steps 
to ensure compliance with court orders. Such affirmative action may 
obviate the need for in-court skirmishes initiated by the parties over 
refusals to produce ordered documents. There is some validity to 
the argument that the court should not be exposed needlessly to 
documents which may or may not be later offered in evidence.74 But 
judges are constantly required to rule on the admissibility of ev-
idence in nonjury cases, and thus are presumably able, in arriving 
at their decisions on the merits, to recognize the inadmissible ma-
terial that they have seen and to give it no weight. It also is unlikely 
that the judge will assume direct personal control over the depos-
itory; probably he will in practice assign that function to clerical 
personnel. 
There are several ways, according to the Manual, in which 
the utility of document depositories could be increased. For ex-
ample, the use of a master would eliminate much of the adminis-
trative burden that would otherwise be on the judge.75 Categoriza-
tion and summarization of the materials submitted to the depository 
are only two of the many functions that a master could perform. 
Similarly, depositories may be made even more functional if the 
techniques of electronic data processing are employed to ease the 
very large discovery burden which exists in cases producing thou-
sands of pages of discoverable matter.76 
The expense of maintaining a depository is to be borne by the 
party who controls the depository and who benefits from not having 
to make multiple production of the same documents.77 A strong 
72, A.C.T.L. Report, supra note 22, at 15. 
73. "If orders are not complied with, opposing counsel, who after all is expected 
to inspect documents produced at his request no matter where located, has every 
opportunity to make a motion pursuant to [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 37." 
Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21, at 21-22. 
74. A.C.T .L. Report, supra note 22, at 15. 
75. See text accompanying notes 78-95 infra. 
76. See note 99 infra. 
77. MANUAL § 2.5, at 32, 
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argument can be made, however, that when several parties are con-
tributing to a single depository, the persons conducting discovery 
realize substantial savings by not having to travel to many separate 
depositories and should therefore share in the depository expense. 
The Manual makes no mention of who should bear the expense of 
a court-controlled depository; presumably the cost should be allo-
cated, as nearly as possible, in proportion to the estimated savings 
to each party. 
V. APPOINTMENT OF MASTERS 
The Manual deals rather extensively with the advisability of ap-
pointing a master to perform special functions in connection with a 
complex case. Suggested functions include supervision of the 
discovery process, fact-finding on preliminary motions, and the per-
formance of complicated accounting.78 The Manual's remarks con-
cerning the employment of this procedure, however, are very 
cautionary. Appointment of a master is to be reserved for excep-
tional cases and is then to be made only after discussion with the 
counsel of all parties.79 If a reference is made, the court is advised 
to meet shortly thereafter with the master in an informal conference 
to discuss possible problems. The Manual advises that frequent con-
tact be maintained between the judge and the master and that 
further pretrial conferences concerning the master's activities be held 
if necessary. 
The apparent hesitancy with which the Manual approaches the 
use of masters seems to stem from the statement in Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 53(b), that "reference to a master shall be the ex-
ception and not the rule," and from the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in La Buy v. Howes Leather Company,80 inter-
preting that language strictly. In La Buy, the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit had issued a writ of mandamus to a district judge 
to vacate an order referring an antitrust suit to a master. The court 
of appeals held that the congestion of the trial calendar and the com-
plexity of the issues did not constitute the exceptional conditions 
that under rule 53 may alone justify reference of a nonjury case in 
its entirety.81 The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the court 
of appeals, noting that if court congestion were in itself sufficient 
to warrant reference, the use of masters in some populous districts 
78. Id. § 3.2, at 60-63. It is the broad consensus of opinion that the use of masters 
to supervise discovery should be made only in exceptional cases in which there is a 
compelling showing of need. A.C.T .L. Report, supra note 22, at 13; Outline Memoran-
dum, supra note 41, at 6. · 
79. See MANUAL § 3.22, at 62; Kirkland Memorandum, supra note 28, at 6. 
80. 352 U .s. 249, 256 (1957). 
81. 226 F.2d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 1955). 
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would become the rule rather than the exception. The Court's atti-
tude was further reflected in the statement that masters were not to 
"displace the court," but were to be used only to assist the judge in 
specific duties. 82 
The La Buy decision makes it clear that reference of a case in 
its entirety should be extremely rare.83 When the master's duties are 
limited in scope, however, the standard of exceptional circumstances 
has been somewhat relaxed.84 It has been suggested that when a 
master is appointed to supervise the pretrial discovery in a complex 
case which in other respects remains under the general direction of 
the trial judge, the reference is sufficiently limited in scope so that 
the rule of La Buy is inapplicable.85 Indeed, when reference is lim-
ited to big cases, the "exception not the rule" policy of rule 53 is 
preserved; and when the scope of the referral is confined to super-
vising discovery, there is only a minor usurpation of the judicial 
function. Nevertheless, the Manual has apparently adopted the nar-
rower position reflected in La Buy. . 
Even assuming that federal law permits the pretrial handling 
of a complex case to be referred to a master, that referral procedure, 
as the Manual has noted, is subject to several objections. One is that 
the judge will not familiarize himself with the case during its pre-
trial phase as completely as he would have if he had personally super-
vised discovery, and that, therefore, he will be less competent and 
efficient in deciding pretrial motions and in trying the case.86 That 
criticism, however, is valid only if, as the Manual suggests, a single 
judge is assigned to the complex case for all purposes.87 If so, it may 
be true that proper attention during pretrial proceedings will result 
in a more effective trial. But it is arguable that subjecting the trial 
judge to a mass of raw evidentiary material rather than to digested 
compilations of the same material could cloud his over-all under-
standing of the evidence and result in a less organized trial. More-
over, when a case is sufficiently complex to warrant the use of a 
master, the greater importance of other uses of the judge's time 
would seem to justify a referral. In one large case, for example, 
there were over 100,000 pages of depositions, 173 witnesses, and 
45,000 documents the combined pages of which totaled 700,000. 
The master supervising discovery in that case spent more than 
82. 352 U.S. at 256. 
83. 352 U.S. at 256-60. See 2B w. BARRON &: A. HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1162 (C. Wright ed. 1961, Supp. 1968). 
84. See Note, Reference of the Big Case Under Federal Rule 5!J(b): A New Mean-
ing for the "Exceptional Condition" Standard, 65 YALE L.J. 1057, 1065 (1956). 
85. Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L. REY. 452, 465 
(1958). 
86. MANUAL § 3.22, at 62. 
87. Id. § 0.ll, at 12. 
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twenty hours a week in hearings for a period of 350 days. 88 In such 
a situation, it would be a prodigious waste of judicial manpower 
for a judge to devote that much time to discovery hearings in one 
case. Certainly, much more productive use can be made of his time 
in disposing of the trial backlog existing in most courts. Moreover, 
allowing a master to sift through the documents would help to 
prevent the judge from being prejudiced by arguably inadmissible 
evidence.89 
Another major limitation on the employment of masters arises 
from the likelihood that reference will add appreciably to the cost 
of litigation.1i0 While judicial supervision of discovery is provided 
at public expense, the master's compensation as well as other costs 
of reference are charged to the litigants. That factor is especially 
significant when the litigants have unequal economic resources. If, 
in such circumstances, the costs of an impending reference are too 
great, the poorer litigant may be compelled to acquiesce in an other-
wise unacceptable settlement.1l1 Thus, it is questionable whether the 
cost of conserving judicial manpower should be allocated entirely 
to the few litigants whose disputes are expected to require lengthy 
trials.1i2 
It is quite possible, moreover, that reference to a master would 
actually protract the litigation.1!3 A master appointed by the court 
may be able to devote only a limited amount of time to the referred 
case. In addition, repeated resort to the court to obtain decisions 
concerning disputes over rulings of the master and court hearings to 
determine whether the conclusions of the master are to be accepted, 
may tend to prolong the case.1l4 The Manual attempts to deal with 
that problem by recommending that the delegation of authority to 
the master be explicitly defined and that the judge avoid substituting 
his judgment for that of the master in a decision which does not 
involve legal error. Those recommendations, if carried out, should 
discourage unnecessary requests for review of the master's evidentiary 
rulings, and should minimize the extent to which factual disputes 
88. Ferguson v. Ford Motor Co., Civil No. 44-482 (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 1, 1948); 
see Kaufman, supra note 85, at 466. 
89. See text accompanying note 74 supra. 
90. See, e.g., Dickie Memorandum, supra note 48, at 5. See also Lyman v. Reming-
ton Rand, Inc., 188 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1951) ($100,000); Robertshaw-Fulton Control Co. 
v. Patrol Valve Co., 106 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ohio 1952) ($18,000). 
91. See Note, supra note 84, at 1061. 
92. Id. at 1062. It does not seem inappropriate to suggest that when judges and 
masters serve the same function, and the latter is chosen in order to conserve the 
farmer's time, the public should bear the expense of the master's employment. 
93. Id. at 1062. 
94. See Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21, at 24. 
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resolved by the master are reopened in a judicial review of his 
findings.95 
In general, then, although a court should not lightly order a 
referral, it seems clear that when the evidence on an issue involves 
a mass of undigested technical data, of complex scientific testimony, 
or of raw figures and elaborate computations, such an issue is 
particularly suited for the abilities of a special master. The master 
can distill the confusing mass of evidence and can present to the 
fact finder, with brevity and precision, the questions to be resolved. 
Thus, as long as the litigants are not deprived of a judicial determin-
ation of the issues of law, and, as long as the costs are not prohibitive 
to a party, reference to a master should be made whenever conserva-
tion of time would result. 
VI. PROOF OF COMPLEX FACTS 
Significant gains in clarity and efficiency can be achieved in many 
complex cases by using automated processing techniques to prove 
facts which require the manipulation of a great bulk of underlying 
data.96 Accordingly, a large segment of the Manual has been devoted 
to a comprehensive discussion of computer samples, polls, and survey 
evidence.97 The Manual makes several basic recommendations con-
cerning the use of such techniques. Voluminous or complicated data 
should, if possible, be presented at trial in a summarized form, such 
as a chart, graph, or extract.98 By thus eliminating both the introduc-
tion into evidence of volumes of raw data and the resultant in-court 
objections to it, substantial savings of trial time will result. The 
supporting raw data, however, must be made available to opposing 
counsel sufficiently in advance of trial to permit objections to be 
raised to the admissibility of the summarized data. In addition, the 
methods of interpretation and summarization which were used, as 
well as the conclusions drawn, should be made available in advance 
95. MANUAL § 3.22, at 63. 
96. For an example both of the unreasonable size of the materials presented to 
the court in these cases and the techniques for using electronic devices for indexing 
and arranging those materials, see Freed, Improved Information Processing in the 
Conduct of Large '}:rials, in COMPUTERS AND THE LAw 72 (R. Bigelow ed. 1966); Brown, 
Electronic Brains and the Legal Mind: Computing the Data Computer's Collision with 
Law, 71 YALE L.J. 239 (1961). 
97. Special Meeting, supra note 51, at 78-91 (remarks of Professor Arthur R. Miller 
of the Univ. of Michigan Law School). 
98. MANUAL § 2.611, at !16. For a detailed example of how to set up and use com-
puter data in the trial of a complex case, see Freed, Machine Data Processing Systems 
for the Trial Lawyer, 6 PRAc. LAw. 73, 78-96 (April 1960); Lozowick, Steiner &: Miller, 
Law and Quantitative Multivariate Analysis: An Encounter, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1641, 
1674-78 (1968). 
322 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 68:303 
of trial.99 That procedure will frequently permit decisions on the 
admissibility of the summarizations to be made prior to trial. More-
over, by submitting the research design or a presampling before the 
full-scale data gathering and tabulation is undertaken, it may be 
possible to correct or to eliminate legal and practical flaws in the 
mechanics of a proposed survey before a major research investment 
is made.100 
The Manual takes the position that polls and surveys should be 
encouraged whenever the tests of trustworthiness and necessity are 
met.101 The trustworthiness of survey evidence depends mainly on 
whether the techniques employed in conducting the survey are within 
accepted principles of survey research.102 The necessity for the use 
of samples or polls depends upon whether proof by other methods 
is shown to be impractical. The more subjective the data to be 
surveyed, that is, the more it is based on beliefs or opinions, the 
higher the standard of necessity should be. 103 The Manual therefore 
suggests that the court inquire as to how the parties intend to use 
such evidence.104 That inquiry is to be made early in the pretrial 
process so that the court may issue appropriate pretrial orders con-
cerning both the discovery and the proposed use at trial of elec-
tronically derived material. Subsequently, at the third principal 
pretrial conference, the court, having previously inquired as to the 
possible use of computer runs, should require divulgence of the raw 
data, of the method or program which has been employed in sum-
marizing or evaluating the data, and of all the results derived, both 
favorable and unfavorable.105 The last requirement has met with 
some opposition. It is argued that required disclosure of unfavorable 
results will discourage experimentation in the use of data processing 
to gather evidence-an objective the Manual clearly intends to 
advance.106 According to that argument, in many areas in which 
computer evidence may be useful, certain basic hypotheses upon 
99. MANUAL § 2.613, at 43. 
100. It is important to realize that survey results are neutral; only the conclusions 
drawn from them favor a particular side. Therefore both parties can cooperate to set 
up the survey. Early, The Use of Survey Evidence in Antitrust Proceedings, 33 WASH. 
L. REv. 380, 397 (1958). 
101. MANUAL § 2.612, at 37-42. 
102. See Zeisel, The Uniqueness of Survey Evidence, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 322, 339 
(1960). 
103. See generally Sorenson 8e Sorenson, The Admissibility and Use of Opinion 
Research Evidence, 28 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1213 (1953); "Wheaton, What Is Rearsay1, 46 
IOWA L. REv. 210, 218 (1960). 
104. MANUAL § 2.6, at 33. 
105. Id. § 3.52, at 72. For an evaluation of differing results and the means to 
handle the problem, see Sorenson 8e Sorenson, supra note 103, at 1240-57. 
106. A.C.T L. Report, supra note 22, at 16; Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21, 
at 25, 
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which the ultimate survey is to be based must be chosen by trial and 
error. If unfavorable conclusions based on false hypotheses must be 
disclosed in discovery, those conclusions can be subsequently used 
by the opposition to discredit, perhaps unduly, the program eventu-
ally employed. Accordingly, inhibitions against utilizing survey 
evidence will naturally result.107 While that criticism is valid, it may 
be argued in defense of the Manual's position that if more than one 
answer is possible, that factor itself is relevant to the validity of the 
results actually used and should be discoverable and thus made 
available to the trier of fact. If the original hypothesis is actually mis-
taken, that fact can be explained in direct examination. Further-
more, disclosure of conflicting results may be the best way to remove 
any notion that the conclusions are an infallible scientific determina-
tion.1os 
By its extended and favorable discussion of the evidentiary value 
of data processing, the Manual has taken bold steps into an area 
where courts for too long have neglected to venture. Perhaps the 
Manual may provide the impetus needed to move reluctant judges 
to use technologically complex, but extremely valuable electronic 
and computer-formulated evidence. 
VII. COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS 
The Manual recommends that upon completion of discovery, 
and prior to the final pretrial conference, the court should consider 
appointing its own expert.109 That procedure is to be employed when 
the experts presented by the parties have expressed irreconcilable 
opinions on important issues in the case,110 for it is thought to be 
unwise to require a lay trier of fact to resolve conflicts of complex 
opinions without the benefit of hearing an expert chosen by the 
court.m If the irreconcilable views are a function of divergent factual 
107. A.C.T.L. Report, supra note 22, at 16. 
108. See Sorenson &: Sorenson, supra note 103, at 1221; Zeise!, supra note 102, at 
344. 
109. MANUAL § 3.51, at 70. 
ll0. At the third principal pretrial conference, the parties are to submit, along 
with their final pretrial brief, written offers of proof including summarization of the 
opinions of their experts. Id. § 3.3, at 64-68. The Manual also contemplates the use 
of preclusion orders to prevent the raising of any factual matter not included in the 
final brief. See text accompanying notes 130-38 infra. The Manual urges early dis-
closure of the contents of the proposed testimony of the experts. However, "1,mless 
postponed to a date when discovery has been completed, [such a procedure] works a 
hardship on the parties. Proper preparation of an expert cannot be completed early 
in the discovery stage. Any early summary will, of necessity, not be very meaningful." 
Kirkland Memorandum, supra note 28, at 8. 
111. See Korn, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 1080 
(1966); Prettyman, Proof of Scientific and Technical Facts, 21 F.R.D. 466 (1957); 
Whinery, Court Experts and the Proof of Scientific Fact-An Experiment in Law 
Reform, 23 F.R.D. 481 (1958). 
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assumptions rather than a result of different underlying theories, the 
court is to determine whether the resolution of the factual issues is 
within the competence of the trier of fact. If not, appointment of a 
court expert may be indicated. When the dispute concerns the proper 
theoretical approach to the evidence, the judge is to acquaint himself 
with the well-recognized schools of thought in the field, in order to 
determine whether it would be worthwhile to present experts with 
viewpoints not presented by the parties.112 
The problems raised by the court appointment of an expert 
depend upon how the expert is to be used. In general he may be 
employed either to interpret evidence which has been introduced by 
the parties or to present additional evidence.113 While both functions 
present serious problems, it is the second which has caused the 
expert section to evoke stronger criticism than has been directed 
toward any other part of the Manual.114 It is argued that the court 
has abandoned its traditional role of neutrality and, by employing 
its own experts to produce additional evidence, has donned the 
cloak of an advocate.115 The proponents of that position admit that 
the court still has no interest in the outcome of the case; but 
they argue that, by searching out a representative of a school of 
thought not explored or presented by the parties, and by permitting 
him to produce new evidence or to render new opinions, the court 
has initiated an action that could substantially affect the outcome of 
the litigation by aiding or injuring some litigant. In an adversary 
system, the risk of nonpersuasion normally falls upon the litigants; 
and if the burden imposed upon a party is not met, the party cannot 
prevail.116 That burden, critics· feel, should not be made lighter or 
heavier by the introduction of testimony which originates with the 
court. 
The criticism of the Manual's proposal appears to have much 
merit. Once the court-appointed expert testifies, it would be difficult, 
if not impossible, for a jury to avoid the conclusion that the parties' 
experts are unduly biased and that their testimony is therefore 
deserving of little weight.117 Similarly, in a nonjury case, the judge 
112. Some lawyers contend that an impartial expert cannot have the knowledge 
and experience of the parties' experts and that therefore the information needed by 
the judge should be obtained in conference with the parties' experts and lawyers. 
See, e.g., Andrus, The Court Appointed Expert, 23 F.R.D. 519 (1958). 
113. See Sink, The Unused Power of a Federal Judge To Call His Own Expert 
Witness, 29 S. CAL. L. REv. 195, 211-13 (1956). 
114. See Outline Memorandum, supra note 41, at 6-8; Special Meeting, supra note 
51, at 55-58 (remarl<s of Don H. Jackson of Jackson, Barker 8: Sherman, Kansas City, 
Mo.). 
115. See Dickie Memorandum, supra note 48, at 4. 
116. Sink, supra note 113, at 212. 
117. A.C.T.L. Report, supra note 22, at 21. The parties would naturally have the 
opportunity to cross-examine and to rebut the testimony of the court's expert. See Cole-
man, Use of Inter-Parties Neutral Witnesses in Patent Cases, 21 F.R.D. 548, 550 (1957). 
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may have greater respect for the expert he has appointed. Indeed, 
with the appearance of a court-appointed expert, there is a very 
strong possibility that the fact finder may give almost conclusive 
weight to that expert's testimony, because it was produced by judicial 
intervention, and therefore implicitly approved by the court.118 The 
Manual has attempted to respond to that criticism by providing that, 
in a jury case, an appropriate cautionary instruction be given in 
order to prevent the jury from ascribing undue weight to an expert's 
testimony solely because of his court appointment.119 But such in-
struction, while better than no guidance at all, does not seem to be 
a sufficiently strong repudiation to prevent the "court-expert" from 
becoming in fact the ultimate juror.120 
In an earlier draft of the Manual, it was stated that a court-ap-
pointed expert need not be available for deposition by the parties, 
and that the data upon which his opinion was based was not required 
to be made accessible to the parties.121 The Manual now provides 
that the expert's data must be available to the parties and that his 
deposition may be taken;122 but before deposing the court-appointed 
expert, the party must obtain permission from the court.123 That re-
quirement of obtaining permission suggests that the court's expert 
is still not to be as freely accessible as are the litigants' experts, who 
may be deposed as a matter of right.124 Surely, however, if the court 
is permitted to select an additional expert, it is not unreasonable for 
the parties to be able to depose him on the same basis as other wit-
nesses.1211 In the Appendix of Materials related to this portion of the 
Manual, it is even suggested that the expert need not be made avail-
able at trial, but can advise the court "in camera."126 That proposal 
has elicited strenuous objection on the ground that it denies the 
parties not only the right to cross-examine, but also the right to 
know the content of the information conveyed to the trier of fact 
during out-of-court sessions.127 
In light of the serious problems created by the use of court-
118. Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21, at 35. 
119. MANUAL § 3.51, at 70-71. 
120. See Special Meeting, supra note 51, at 56 (remarks of Don H. Jackson of Jack-
son, Barker &: Sherman, Kansas City, Mo.). See also Note, The New York Medical 
Expert Project: An Experiment in Securing Impartial Testimony, 63 YALE L.J. 1023, 
1029 n.39 (1954) (remarks of I. Halpern, Attorney, New York City). 
121. Proposed Draft of the Manual, May 2, 1968, at 37. 
122. MANUAL § 3.51, at 71. 
123. Id. 
124. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a), 30(a), 3I(a). 
125. See Letter from Don M. Jackson of Jackson, Barker &: Sherman, Kansas City, 
Mo., to Cyrus V. Anderson, Associate General Counsel of PPG Industries, Inc., Pitts-
burg, July I, 1968, at 4 [hereinafter Jackson Memorandum]. 
126. MANUAL, APPENDIX § 3.5l(f), at 277. 
127. Jackson Memorandum, supra note 125, at 5. 
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appointed experts, it is fortunate that the Manual indicates that 
such an appointment should be the exception rather than the 
rule.128 Indeed, commentators on the Manual have suggested that 
this procedure should be employed only with the consent of coun-
sel.129 That strict limitation seems especially appropriate for jury 
trials when a cautionary instruction may be of limited effect. 
VIII. PRECLUSION ORDERS 
In an effort to streamline the trial process in complex cases, the 
Manual recommends the use of orders which prohibit the parties 
from offering into evidence or othenvise raising any legal or factual 
matters not included in their final pretrial briefs unless they can 
show "good cause" for doing so.130 However, requiring a litigant to 
show good cause for admitting additional evidence-that is, that a 
refusal to admit new matter at trial could prejudice his case-may be 
inconsistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b). That rule 
provides that if the admission of evidence is objected to at trial on 
the ground that it is not within the issues formed by the pleadings, 
the court should allow the pleadings to be amended, and should do 
so freely as long as the presentation of the merits will be furthered 
and as long as the objecting party fails to show that the admission 
will be prejudicial to his action or defense. Thus, preclusion of 
additional evidence except upon a showing of good cause appears to 
be contrary to the federal policy of liberal admission of evidence.131 
It can be argued, however, that rule 15(b) was intended to deal with 
the "average" case, such as a personal injury suit. In such cases, hur-
ried preparation often raises the likelihood that new evidence will 
come to light or that a change in legal theory will be necessary sub-
sequent to any cursory pretrial attempt to frame the issues or to limit 
the evidence. But in a complex suit, when several pretrial con-
ferences are held in order to define the issues, and when all parties 
are aware of the evidence that has been discovered and is to be 
introduced, rule 15(b)'s objective of attempting to insure that the 
merits of the case are fully heard will be satisfied even if preclusion 
orders are allowed. Admittedly, the Manual has placed the burden 
of demonstrating prejudice upon the counsel who is seeking to offer 
the new evidence rather than upon the party objecting to its in-
troduction, as contemplated by rule 15(b).132 Yet, if the purpose of 
128. MANUAL § 3.51, at 70. 
129. Pendleton Memorandum, supra note 62, at 9; Kirkland Memorandum, supra 
note 28, at 6. 
130. MANUAL § 1.4, at 21; § 2.4, at 31. 
131. See Jackson Memorandum, supra note 125, at 3; ABA Section of General 
Practice Memorandum, supra note 25, at 2. 
132. See text following note 130 supra. 
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the rule has been otherwise fulfilled, then the use of preclusion 
orders to avoid delay and disorder at trial is in the interest of justice. 
Any conflict that still remains with the spirit of rule 15(b) can be 
eliminated by admitting precluded evidence whenever a relatively 
low level of good cause has been shown. 
An earlier draft of the Manual stated not only that showing good 
cause was necessary before new evidence could be admitted, but also 
that "except in rare instances" preclusion orders should be issued 
after the submission of pretrial briefs.133 Critics contended that the 
l\fanual erred in recommending that preclusion orders be used "ex-
cept in rare instances."134 They argued that, regardless of the degree 
of care exercised in discovery and in preparation for trial, the legal 
and factual issues involved in a complex case defy total mastery by 
the parties. It was therefore felt to be unreasonably harsh automat-
ically to preclude litigants from introducing facts or legal theories 
which were discovered after the final pretrial conference.135 It was 
likewise contended that unpredictable developments during the trial 
might make it necessary to offer additional evidence.136 It is not 
clear, however, whether the phrase, "except in rare instances," 
was deleted in response to that criticism, nor what the present 
standard of using preclusion orders is. If the final version of the 
Manual contemplates a strict interpretation of "good cause" so that 
preclusion orders will be used extensively, the critics' arguments are 
still viable. But those arguments are not totally convincing today. 
The present Manual does not require that final pretrial briefs be 
submitted until after £ull discovery on the merits, and then only a 
short time prior to trial.137 In a complex antitrust or product liability 
case involving several parties and large damage claims, it seems likely 
that legal theories will be formulated well in advance of the final 
pretrial conference. Since most complex cases remain in the pretrial 
stage for two to three years, it does not appear unreasonable to expect 
adequate preparation by trial counsel during that period. Moreover, 
if unanticipated contingencies do arise, the judge may, upon a show-
ing of good cause, disregard his own preclusion order as long as the 
new evidence will not cause material prejudice to the party against 
whom that evidence is to be used.138 The requirement of showing 
good cause seems to be a small burden when contrasted with the pos-
sible advantages that can result from limiting the introduction of 
evidence at trial to that evidence which is sufficiently important to 
133. Proposed Draft of the Manual, May 2, 1968, at 34. 
134. A.C.T.L. Report, supra note 22, at 19. 
135. Id. 
136. Jackson Memorandum, supra note 125, at 3. 
137. MANUAL § 3.3, at 64. 
138, MANUAL § 4.2, at 76. 
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be included in the final pretrial brief. Of course, it is arguable that 
using preclusion orders in this way will impel each litigant to in-
clude every remotely important matter in his brief, thus circumvent-
ing the thrust of the preclusion order. But it seems unlikely that an 
attorney would weaken the effect of his pretrial brief by including 
obscure matters in it, in an effort to avoid a preclusion order which 
could be overcome by a showing of good cause. 
IX. MULTIPLE AND MULTIDISTRIGr LITIGATION 
The basic object of the Manual's recommendation on multiple 
and multidistrict litigation is to promote consolidation of cases which 
contain one or more common questions of fact, whenever such con-
solidation will eliminate repetitious litigation.139 Once consolidation 
has been accomplished, the previously discussed procedures for com-
plex cases are to be used.140 When the identification process has 
located a group of related cases, the court is to investigate the possibili-
ties of using a class action, rather than consolidation, to avoid multi-
ple litigation.141 A class action is a simpler and a more efficient means 
of combining related cases than is consolidation, and should there-
fore be used whenever possible. The litanual cautions, however, that 
courts must be careful to avoid entering parallel orders for the main-
tenance of actions based on the compulsory provisions of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.142 If such orders should be entered, 
resolution can be achieved only at the appellate level. The Manual 
suggests ttvo methods of protecting against that occurrence:143 that 
informal contacts be made among the judges involved in related ac-
tions which are potentially class actions; and that the Judicial Panel 
on Multidistrict Litigation, recently established by Congress,144 ex-
ercise general supervision of the pretrial proceedings in all poten-
tially multidistrict class actions. 
If a class action is inappropriate, the Manual states, the related 
suits should be consolidated. Since the problems of consolidation 
vary, the Manual deals with a variety of possible situations. The 
simplest situation involves related cases pending in one division of 
139. The feeling of the Co-Ordinating Committee on this point was reflected in the 
statement of Judge Becker that "consolidated treatment of common issues in multi• 
district litigation has in nearly all cases resulted in decreased costs to all concerned, 
even after traveling expenses are considered." Judge William H. Becker, Memorandum 
on Professor Miller's Suggestions to Chief Judge Alfred P. Murrah, May 3, 1968, at 6. 
[hereinafter Becker Memorandum]. 
140. MANUAL § 5.13, at 89. 
141. Id. § 5.5, at 99-100. 
142. Id.; see Fm. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(l)·(2). 
143. MANUAL § 5.5, at 99-100. 
144. That panel was created in 1968 by the passage of Pub. L. 90-296 (April 29, 
1968), 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). See notes 160-69 infra and accompanying 
text. 
December 1969] Comments 329 
a single district.145 The Manual recommends that, in those circum-
stances, a single judge be assigned to all of the related cases in order 
to gain the advantages of centralized management. Once that as-
signment is made, the judge can order consolidation of the cases 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a). If, however, 
there is a possibility of prejudice to a party's case through con-
solidation with several other cases or for any other reason, the judge 
may order the cases combined solely for limited purposes.146 
If the related cases are pending in several divisions of a single 
district, consolidation becomes more complex.147 The Manual states 
that authority to transfer all such cases to a single division is given 
by section 1404(b) of Title 28 of the United States Code.148 If that 
interpretation of section I 404(b) is correct, transfer of the cases to 
a single division would permit the application of the consolidation 
procedure outlined above. The statute, however, provides that 
transfer is permissible "[u]pon motion, consent or stipulation of all 
parties .... "149 But, despite that language, the Manual contends that, 
while obtaining consent or stipulation of all parties is desirable, 
transfer can be made upon the initiative of the court, even over the 
objection of a party. 
Even more complex problems arise when related cases are pend-
ing in two or more districts of a single circuit.150 The first step in 
that instance is to transfer the cases in each district to a single divi-
sion, pursuant to section 1404(b).151 With that accomplished, the 
1\Ianual states, four possible courses of action are then available: 152 
(I) to coordinate pretrial proceedings through the judges of the 
separate districts; (2) to transfer all cases within the circuit to a 
single district pursuant to section 1404(a) of title 28;153 (3) to as-
sign one judge to all related cases in the various districts; or (4) to 
consolidate all cases for pretrial purposes pursuant to section 1407.154 
145. MANUAL § 5.1, at 87. 
146. See Note, Consolidation in Mass Tort Litigation, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 373, 377 
(1962). 
147. MANUAL § 5.2, at 90. 
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(b) (1964) provides in pertinent part: 
Upon motion, consent or stipulation of all parties, any action, suit or proceeding 
of a civil nature or any motion or hearing thereof, may be transferred, in the 
discretion of the court, from the division in which pending to any other division 
in the same district. Transfer of proceedings in rem brought by or on behalf of 
the United States may be transferred under this section without the consent of 
the United States where all other parties request transfer. 
149. 28 u.s.c. § 1404(b) (1964). 
150. MANUAL § 5.3, at 93. The same problems arise from the filing of related cases 
in more than one circuit, and they should be handled by the same procedures dis-
cussed in the text. 
151. See note 148 supra. 
152. MANUAL § 5.32, at 94-97. 
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964) states in pertinent part: "For the convenience of 
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil 
action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) states in pertinent part: 
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Coordination of the separate pretrials is suggested for instances 
in which the entire mass of litigation cannot be transferred because 
of lack of venue in the transferee forum or because of the great 
(a) When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are 
pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for 
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfer shall be made by 
the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its 
determination that transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of 
parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such ac-
tions. Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the 
conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was trans-
ferred unless it shall have been previously terminated: Provided, however, That 
the panel may separate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim 
and remand any of such claims before the remainder of the action is remanded. 
(b) Such coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings shall be conducted 
by a judge or judges to whom such actions are assigned by the judicial panel on 
multidistrict litigation. For this purpose, upon request of the panel, a circuit 
judge or a district judge may be designated and assigned temporarily for service 
in the transferee district by the Chief Justice of the United States or the chief 
judge of the circuit, as may be required, in accordance with the provisions of 
chapter 13 of this title. With the consent of the transferee district court, such 
actions may be assigned by the panel to a judge or judges of such district. The 
judge or judges to whom such actions are assigned, the members of the judicial 
panel on multidistrict litigation, and other circuit and district judges designated 
when needed by the panel may exercise the powers of a district judge in any 
district for the purpose of conducting pretrial depositions in such coordinated 
or consolidated pretrial proceedings. 
(c) Proceedings for the transfer of an action under this section may be initiated 
by-
(i) the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation upon its own initiative, or 
(ii) motion filed with the panel by a party in any action in which transfer 
for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings under this section may be 
appropriate. A copy of such motion shall be filed in the district court in which 
the moving party's action is pending. 
The panel shall give notice to the parties in all actions in which transfers for 
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings are contemplated, and such notice 
shall specify the time and place of any hearing to determine whether such transfer 
shall be made. Orders of the panel to set a hearing and other orders of the panel 
issued prior to the order either directing or denying transfer shall be filed in the 
office of the clerk of the district court in which a transfer hearing is to be or has 
been held. The panel's order of transfer shall be based upon a record of such 
hearing at which material evidence may be offered by any party to an action 
pending in any district that would be affected by the proceedings under this sec-
tion, and shall be supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law based 
upon such record. Orders of transfer and such other orders as the panel may make 
thereafter shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of the trans-
feree district and shall be effective when thus filed. The clerk of the transferee 
district court shall forthwith transmit a certified copy of the panel's order to 
transfer to the clerk of the district court from which the action is being trans-
ferred. An order denying transfer shall be filed in each district wherein there is 
a case pending in which the motion for transfer has been made. 
(d) The judicial panel on multidistrict litigation shall consists of seven circuit 
and district judges designated from time to time by the Chief Justice of the 
United States, no two of whom shall be from the same circuit, The concurrence 
of four members shall be necessary to any action by the panel. 
(e) No proceedings for review of any order of the panel may be permitted 
except by extraordinary writ pursuant to the provisions of title 28, section 1651, 
United States Code. Petitions for an extraordinary writ to review an order of the 
panel to set a transfer hearing and other orders of the panel issued prior to the 
order either directing or denying transfer shall be filed only in the court of ap-
peals having jurisdiction over the district in which a hearing is to be or has been 
held. Petitions for an extraordinary writ to review an order to transfer or orders 
subsequent to transfer shall be filed only in the court of appeals having jurisdic-
tion over the transferee district. There shall be no appeal or review of an order 
of the panel denying a motion to transfer for consolidated or coordinated pro• 
ceedings. 
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burden placed upon a single judge. That method of proceeding may 
often prove quite effective; through coordinated planning, the 
economies of combined discovery can be achieved without requiring 
a party to forego his choice of forum. 
If venue permits, and if justice and the convenience of the parties 
will be served, transfer of related actions to one district, pursuant to 
section 1404(a), is frequently the most desirable course of action. 
When cases are transfered from one district to another, however, 
questions of applicable law arise. The basic rule is that the law which 
the transferor district would have applied must be applied in the 
transferee forum.151• Thus, the law applicable to one transfered case 
may be different from the law aplicable to another, and a considera-
ble amount of discord could result.156 The possible confusion which 
may be generated by transfer, then, should be considered first by 
the original court before transfer is ordered, and again by the 
transferee court when determining for what purposes consolidation 
will be employed. Although potential conflicts problems may not 
pose a serious threat to the utility of a transfer, since most of the 
cases for which a transfer will be ordered are federal-question cases, 157 
those problems may prove troublesome in consolidating related ac-
tions based on state law. For example, if a number of plaintiffs seek 
recovery for a product defect under the tort laws of various states, 
their cases should not be consolidated for all purposes, since dif-
ferences in the applicable law may change the burdens of proof which 
must be met to recover or the facts which must be established for 
recovery. Even in such cases, however, consolidation for discovery 
purposes alone may prove to be both simple and economical. Thus, 
in appropriate cases, transfer should be ordered preparatory to that 
limited form of consolidation. 
The value of assigning one judge to all related cases in the 
separate districts is highly questionable.158 While some of the bene-
fits of centralized management might be achieved by applying this 
assignment technique, the difficulties in efficiently scheduling mo-
tion hearings and trials, as well as the travel burden placed upon the 
judge, seem to outweigh any of the advantages of that technique.159 
The Manual's last suggestion for dealing with multidistrict litiga-
155. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). 
156. Letter from Professor Arthur R. Miller, Univ. of Michigan Law School, to 
Chief Judge Alfred P. Murrah, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 
Jan. 15, 1968, at 5-6. See Comment, The Search for the Most Convenient Federal 
Forum: Three Solutions to the Problems of Multidistrict Litigation, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 
188, 196-200 (1969). 
157. See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra. 
158. l\L\NUAL § 5.32(3], at 96. 
159. Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21, at 7. 
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tion has been made possible by the passage of section 1407, which 
provides for the creation of a Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litiga-
tion.160 Unlike section 1404(a), which requires that a case be trans-
ferred in its entirety to another district, section 1407 permits the 
transfer of cases solely for pretrial purposes. The order for consolida-
tion under section 1407 is to be made by the Judicial Panel on Multi-
district Litigation, either on its own initiative or on petition of the 
parties, whenever such action is warranted by "the convenience of 
the parties and witnesses and the promotion of just and efficient con-
duct" of multidistrict actions.161 The limitation on the section 1407 
transfer, which differentiates it from a section 1404 transfer, is that 
the cases must be remanded to the transferor court for trial.162 Under 
that procedure, pretrial discovery and motions can be coordinated 
without burying the individual case in the mass of related cases. 
The 1vfanual recommends that in some instances, after the section 
160. That panel consists of seven federal circuit and district judges designated by 
the Chief Justice of the United States, no two of whom can be from the same cir• 
cuit. The concurrance of four members is necessary before any action can be taken. 
Section 1407(a) provides that when civil actions involving one or more common ques-
tions of fact are pending in different districts, the actions may be transferred by the 
panel to any one district so that there can be coordinated or consolidated pretrial 
proceedings. That transfer is to be made upon the panel's determination that the 
transfer will be for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and will promote the 
just and efficient conduct of such actions. Section 1407(b) provides that coordinated 
or consolidated pretrial proceedings be heard by a judge or judges to whom such 
actions are assigned by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. That subsection 
also provides for the return of those actions to the transferor district upon comple-
tion of the consolidated or coordinated pretrial proceedings. 
Although the panel has been in operation for only a short time, it has already 
transferred massive multidistrict litigation comparable to the electrical equipment 
cases. See note 14 supra. See, e.g., In re Plumbing Fixtures Cases, 295 F. Supp. 33 
(1968), 298 F. Supp. 484 (1968); In re Protection Devices & Equip. Cases, 295 F. Supp. 
39 (1968). The panel has also consolidated smaller groups of related cases. See, e.g., 
In re Gypsum Wallboard, 297 F. Supp. 1350 (1969) (three cases transferred); In re Mid 
Air Collision Near Henderson, N.C., 297 F. Supp. 1039 (1969) (two cases transferred). 
In both of the latter transfers, however, a considerable number of related cases were 
already pending at the time of transfer. In a case in which the motion concerned only 
two cases and they involved no "exceptional" common issues of fact, the panel denied 
transfer of the two cases. In re Scotch Whiskey, 299 F. Supp. 543 (1969). 
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). The panel has stressed this twofold 
test of transfer. The convenience test looks to the convenience of all the parties and 
all the witnesses; indeed, the panel has transferred several actions in which the incon-
venience of one party has been overridden by looking at all the actions as a whole. 
See In re Library Editions of Children's Books, 297 F. Supp. 385 (1968); In re Plumb-
ing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484 (1968); In re Air Crash Disaster at Greater Cincin-
nati Airport, Constancy, Ky., 298 F. Supp. 353 (1968) (one defendant named in only 
one action; motion for severance from a § 1407 transfer denied). The promotion of 
just and efficient conduct is important in the transfer of cases which have different 
legal theories but similar fact situations (see note 163 infra), and in the denial of 
transfer when the pretrial proceedings in some of the related actions are nearly com-
plete. See In re Air Crash Disaster at Falls City, Neb., 298 F. Supp. 1323 (1969); In re 
Protection Devices & Equip. Cases, 295 F. Supp. 39 (1968); In re Eisler Patents, 297 F. 
Supp. 1034 (1968) (Most of the related cases in which transfer was requested had al-
ready been dismissed in court.). 
162. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
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1407 procedures are completed, further consolidation for trial 
through the use of section 1404 may be desirable.163 However, an 
additional standard must be met to permit transfer under section 
1404. Section I 404(a) requires that the transferee court be one "where 
the case might have been brought" in the first instance.164 That 
provision preserves both the venue requirements for trial and the 
parties choice of forum. It also permits separate trials of local issues 
and avoids many of the problems of determining the applicable law. 
But most cases in which consolidation for pretrial purposes under 
section 1407 is advantageous seem likely to profit also from consolida-
tion for trial under section 1404.165 Still, if the standard of section 
1404 is not met, the benefits of that consolidation will be lost. 
When only a section 1407 pretrial consolidation is made and 
there is no consolidation for trial, further problems arise. For 
example, the close control of the case by a single judge-one of the 
principal recommendations of the Manual166-is lost when the case 
is returned to various district courts for trial. The Manual does sug-
gest that conferences be held among all of the judges involved in 
such trials,167 but that seems to be an inadequate remedy. Certainly, 
the possibility of conflicting judgments on similar facts is increased 
by the very fact that many different judges or juries are hearing the 
related cases. Nevertheless, that objection to the section 1407 proce-
dure should not be controlling if it is determined that the interests 
in having local courts decide local issues, in preventing possible 
conflicts in the applicable law, and in preserving forum protection 
override the considerations which gave rise to the basic expediting 
procedures of the Manual. 
Another objection that will have to be faced in attempting to 
use a section 1407 transfer is the suggestion that transfer be denied 
if there is a significant possibility of settlement before trial.168 How-
163. MANUAL § 5.32[4], at 96. 
164. 28 U .S.C. § 1404(a) (1964). 
165. In the electrical equipment cases, over twenty § 1404 motions followed the 
closing of consolidated discovery. Many were granted at the court's discretion over 
the parties' objections. See, e.g., I.T .E. Circuit Breaker Co. v. Regan, 348 F.2d 403 (8th 
Cir. 1965); I.T.E. Circuit Breaker Co. v. Becker, 343 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1965); see 
Comment, Consolidation of Pretrial Proceedings Under Proposed Section 1407 of the 
Judicial Code: Unanswered Questions of Transfer and Review, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 558, 
562 (1966). The panel, however, has transferred several cases in which the underlying 
legal doctrines differed and thus in which a combined trial would not be so ad-
vantageous. In re Antibiotic Drugs, 299 F. Supp. 1403, 1406 (1969); In re 4th Class 
Postage Regulations, 298 F. Supp. 1326 (1969); In re Air Crash Disaster at Greater 
Cincinnati Airport, Constancy, Ky., 295 F. Supp. 51 (1968). 
Trials that may be transferred under § 1404(a) may not be transferred for pre-
trial consolidation under § 1407. For a discussion of the possible conflict in applica-
tion of §§ 140!(a) and 1407, see Comment, supra note 156, at 203-05. 
166. MANUAL § 0.3, at 12; § 1.1, at 18-19. These provisions are carryovers of the 
primary recommendations of the Prettyman Report and the Handbook. 
167. MANUAL § 5.32[3], at 96. 
168. See Comment, Consolidation of Pretrial Proceedings, supra note 165, at 573-75. 
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ever, experience in the electrical equipment cases and in other cases 
seems to indicate that there is a greater simplification of the issues 
and thus more out-of-court settlements when all related issues are 
consolidated for discovery. 
A final problem with section 1407 involves the availability of a 
procedure for appealing the panel's orders. Section 1407(e) provides 
that appeals shall be by extraordinary writ and that they shall be 
made only in the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the 
transferee court. Furthermore, no review exists for the denial of a 
motion to transfer. Those rules may cause the parties some difficulty, 
particularly since any undue cost or burden on the parties arising 
from the transfer to a distant court would be increased by their hav-
ing to process the appeal in the appellate court of that same juris-
diction.169 Accordingly, unless section 1407 is amended to permit 
review of a transfer order by the appellate court having jurisdiction 
over the transferor court, the panel must be sensitive to the added 
and perhaps prohibitive costs of appealing its order. When the 
merits of a particular transfer are doubtful, the panel should refrain 
from ordering that transfer, since review of the decision by an appel-
late court is unlikely. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Out of the many procedures and recommendations of the Manual 
and the various responses to them, one prime requisite stands out: 
that adequate flexibility is needed in applying and adopting the 
suggestions of the Manual.110 If those suggestions are applied only 
when their application is appropriate, they will greatly increase the 
efficiency of judicial administration while still providing the frame-
work within which a just determination of the issues in controversy 
can be achieved. If they are used improperly or too rigidly, however, 
the achievement of both efficiency and justice may be frustrated.171 
It has been argued that a member of the judiciary who has had 
limited experience in handling complicated litigation would be 
swayed by the fact that the Manual is the product of a distinguished 
panel of judges and was published with the imprimatur of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States.172 Such a judge, the argu-
That Comment also recommends that the panel, in determining whether to grant 
transfer, consider the number of cases to be consolidated and the number and com· 
plexity of the issues involved. 
169. Id. at 565-73. 
170. See Outline Memorandum, supra note 41, at l; A.C.T.L. Report, supra note 
22, at 1-6; Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21, at 1-5; Special Meeting, supra note 
51, at 11-39 (remarks of Leonard J. Emerglick, Washington, D.C.). 
171. Pendleton Memorandum, supra note 62, at 2. 
172. See note 1 supra. 
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ment runs, might, mistakenly, give the Manual's suggestions the 
status of inflexible rules, rather than using them selectively to fit the 
needs of the specific case.173 Moreover, since complex cases are gen-
erally unique, such unwaivering application will discourage needed 
experimentation.174 Responding to that criticism, the Manual states 
that not all of the recommendations are suitable for every complex 
case,175 and that both judges and lawyers are encouraged to adapt 
and improve them.176 But that general implication of flexibility is 
tempered by the statement that the Manual's suggestions, when used 
in appropriate cases, are the most efficient and just procedures which 
have yet been devised.177 
With the backlog of cases and the prolonged delays that now exist 
in most courts, there clearly is a pressing need for the development of 
effective modem techniques of judicial management. But the 
methods employed to clear dockets must ultimately comport with 
the fundamental goal of providing substantial justice in all cases.178 
Because the Manual has a potentially far-reaching effect, the attain-
ment of that goal requires that the application of the Manual's 
recommendations be flexible.179 Thus, while the Manual provides 
many potentially useful tools for the achievement of efficient judicial 
administration, each court, in order to maximize that potential, must 
retain the authority to apply those tools in a flexible and innovative 
manner. 
173. Special Meeting, supra note 51, at 42 (remarks of Don M. Jackson of Jackson, 
Barker &: Sherman, Kansas City, Mo.); A.C.T.L. Report, supra note 22, at 2. 
174. Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21, at 3. 
175. MANUAL 7. 
176. An important indication that the Manual is intended to be flexible and to 
reflect advances in technique is that the Appendix in the version put out by the 
Committee is in loose-leaf form. See Proc. of the Co-Ordinating Comm. on Complex 
and Multidistrict Litigation, Denver, June 4, 1968, at 37 (remarks of Professor Arthur 
R. Miller of the Univ. of Michigan Law School). In addition, members of the judiciary 
are asked to document important rulings on evidentiary and procedural matters aris-
ing in the big case in order that the Manual may be kept up to date. MANUAL 5 n.l. 
Finally, changes in language have been made throughout the text to emphasize the 
need for experimentation and the employment of a flexible approach suitable to the 
case at hand. Becker Memorandum supra note 139, at 1. See note 2 supra. 
177. A similar "give and take" statement occurs in § 0.4 in which the Manual 
states: 
It is not intended, however, to recommend an inflexible program of holding 
only four principal pretrial conferences. The suggestions made herein are subject 
always to the discretion of each judge to adapt the procedures to the particular 
case or to deviate and innovate where necessary or desirable. However, the first 
principal (Preliminary) and final pretrial conferences ordinarily should be held. 
Id. at 14 (emphasis in original). 
178. Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21, at 9. 
179. Jackson Memorandum, supra note 125, at 6. See also text accompanying notes 
170-71 supra. 
